Is Constitutional Jurisprudence Hostile to Religion? by Shaman, Jeffrey M.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 1 Fall 1992: Symposium - Confronting the 
Wall of Separation: A New Dialogue Between 
Law and Religion on the Meaning of the First 
Amendment 
Article 24 
Is Constitutional Jurisprudence Hostile to Religion? 
Jeffrey M. Shaman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Is Constitutional Jurisprudence Hostile to Religion?, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 317 (1992) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol42/iss1/24 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
IS CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE HOSTILE TO
RELIGION?
Jeffrey M. Shaman*
The question facing this panel is whether the First Amendment is
hostile to religion. My initial response to that question is that the
First Amendment is not hostile to religion. To the contrary, as Dean
Edward Gaffney notes, the words of the First Amendment are
favorable to religion by expressly stating that the government may
not abridge the free exercise of religion.' On the other hand, the
First Amendment is hostile - although I would prefer to say "un-
friendly" - toward government establishment of religion, which is
expressly prohibited by the words of the First Amendment. And I
think it is worth repeating a point that was addressed by other par-
ticipants of this Conference, and in other places, and that is that the
unfriendly stance that the First Amendment takes toward govern-
ment establishment of religion may actually be favorable to religion
in some respects. Certainly many deeply devout persons believe that
government and religion should be kept apart because government
involvement in religion, in any religion, tends to degrade its spiritual
vitality. As James Madison put it: "[R]eligion and Government will
both exist in greater purity the less they are mixed together."2
A dramatic example of that is school prayer. I do not mind ad-
mitting that I went to school in the days before the Supreme Court
ruling that prayer in school was unconstitutional. 3 And back in
those times, we would come to school every morning, report to our
homerooms - I think we had to be there by 8:45 - sit down, and
then promptly say the Pledge of Allegiance, have a reading from the
Bible, and recite the Lord's Prayer in unison. In fact, in tenth grade
I had the honor of being elected chaplain of my homeroom. Being
* Professor of Law, DePaul University; Senior Fellow, American Judicature Society.
1. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
263 (1992).
2. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 3 THE JAMES
MADISON LETTERS 273, 275 (New York, Townsend MacCoun 1884).
3. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that nondenominational school prayer
constitutes establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment).
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totally unqualified for that post, I think that my classmates' vote
was some sort of perverse antireligious joke. In any event, it was
actually my job for an entire school year to read the Bible every
morning and to lead my classmates in prayer each day. And from
that experience I can assure you that while I was reading the Bible,
all of my classmates were either trying to get their homework done
at the last minute, writing notes to one another, or gazing out the
window in a sleepy reverie that turned a deaf ear to the Bible read-
ing for the day. As far as the Lord's Prayer was concerned, we
mumbled our way through it in a rote, mechanical fashion, mispro-
nouncing words and paying no attention along the way. If anything,
the entire exercise was demeaning to religion, and demonstrates that
any hostility the First Amendment has towards government estab-
lishment of religion actually is quite beneficial to religion itself.
The First Amendment, however, like many other constitutional
provisions, is rather general. So, of course, the real question that is
posed to this panel is whether the First Amendment as interpreted
and applied by the Supreme Court is hostile to religion. Unquestion-
ably, in recent years, the Supreme Court has become less tolerant of
the free exercise of religion - especially the exercise of minority
religious practices - while on the other hand, the court has become
more sympathetic to government establishment of religion.
In free exercise cases, the tide turned dramatically last year when
the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,4 which
held that it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause for a state to
punish members of the Native American Church for engaging in a
practice fundamental to their religious beliefs - the sacramental
use of peyote.5 In reaching the decision, five members of the Court,
speaking through Justice Scalia, announced a new approach to free
exercise issues. According to that approach, as long as a law is
within the authority of government and is a neutral law of general
applicability, it may be applied to individuals to prohibit them from
engaging in behavior that is fundamental to their religious beliefs.6
The approach in the Smith case seems to do away with any con-
stitutional religious exemptions from generally applicable laws,
which is something that Professor Marshall has advocated in several
4. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. Id. at 903-07.
6. Id. at 876-78.
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articles prior to the Smith decision.7 Even before Smith, the Su-
preme Court was rather grudging in recognizing any religious ex-
emption. It rarely did it, but there were a few exemptions prior to
Smith that the Court had recognized and allowed. One, of course, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 exempted members of the Amish faith from
compulsory school attendance laws,9 and on several other occasions,
the Court had recognized that Sabbatarians could be exempted
from unemployment compensation requirements.10 In Smith, the
court attempted to distinguish Yoder rather than overrule it" and
barely stopped short of overruling the unemployment compensation
cases. 2 But it is doubtful that any of these cases, including Yoder,
would be decided the same way today.
Professor Gerald Gunther has described the Smith approach as
"obviously mark[ing] a significant departure in free exercise adjudi-
cation. ' '1 3 Professor Michael McConnell has described it as "un-
doubtedly the most important development in the law of religious
freedom in decades. 1 4 The Smith approach is so significant because
it abandons a previous rule that required the government to demon-
strate a compelling state interest for laws that seriously impinged
upon the free exercise of religion. 5 And the Smith case also is sig-
nificant because it forsakes the approach championed by Justice
7. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90) [hereinafter Marshall, The Case
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption]; William P. Marshall, Solving
the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 547 (1983).
8. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. Id. at 234-36.
10. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
11. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 & n.l (1990). The Smith court stated that:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application
of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as . . . the right of parents . . . to direct the
education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder ....
Id. at-881 (citations omitted).
12. The Court in Smith stated that "in recent years we have abstained from applying the Sher-
bert test . . . at all." Id. at 883.
13. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1584 (12th ed. 1991).
14. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).
15. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) for the so-called Sherbert test used in
free exercise challenges. See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). The
Smith Court refused to apply the Sherbert test to this challenge, holding that the test is no longer
appropriate in free exercise challenges to generally applicable criminal laws. Smith, 494 U.S. at
884-85.
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O'Connor which allowed the government to accommodate religious
belief in some circumstances. 6 Here is what the student editors of
the Harvard Law Review have to say about the Supreme Court's
new approach in the Smith Case:
This interpretation of the free exercise clause almost completely obliterates
the Court's vital role as a protector of minority religious interests ...
Smith's sophistic disregard of decades of precedent marks the arrival of an
activist Court characterized by inattention and even hostility toward civil
liberties. . . . This holding interprets the free exercise clause as a mere pro
forma guarantee and effectively abandons the once "fundamental" liberty of
religious conscience ....
Now, those are pretty strong words, especially from a publication
as stodgy as the Harvard Law Review - or, at least, that used to be
kind of stodgy. Still, I think it cannot be denied that the Supreme
Court's ruling in Smith does substantially reduce the constitutional
protection previously afforded by the Supreme Court to religious
practices. It is a change in the law; it is an extremely significant
change in the law; it substantially reduces the constitutional protec-
tion that the Supreme Court previously had granted to religious
practices. Professor Marshall says that the ruling in Smith is not
hostile to religion because "there is no antagonism in equal treat-
ment."' 8 I would suggest, though, that to apply a law or a rule that
superficially seems equal, but to apply it to persons who are in une-
qual positions, results in an inequality and a certain degree of hostil-
ity. So I think that the Smith case is a significant turn against reli-
gious freedom, against the free exercise of religion, that does have a
certain hostility toward religious practices.
Turning to the Establishment Clause, if we ask whether the Su-
preme Court is hostile or unfriendly to government establishment of
religion, I think that the answer has to be that the Supreme Court's
record here is schizophrenic. For a number of years, the Supreme
Court has been severely splintered in Establishment Clause cases
and often is unable to produce a majority opinion in these cases.
The actual decisions in the cases are ludicrously inconsistent.
16. In prior decisions, certain religious beliefs could be exempted from a state's general crimi-
nal prohibition where the practice did not " 'unduly interfere with fulfillment of the [proffered]
governmental interest.'" Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring (quoting United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982))).
17. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 199-201
(1990).
18. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption,
supra note 7, at 409.
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The Supreme Court has held that the government can finance bus
transportation for parochial school students to and from school19 but
not on field trips.20 The Supreme Court has held that the govern-
ment may loan nonreligious textbooks to parochial school students,21
but it may not lend other religious instructional materials such as
maps, magazines, and tape recorders. 2 It is permissible to loan a
book, but impermissible to loan a map. What about an atlas . . . a
book of maps? The Court has prohibited state-sponsored prayer in
school 23 but has given its approval to state-sponsored prayer in state
legislatures, even when the prayer is recited for sixteen years run-
ning by the same Presbyterian chaplain. 4 In so holding, the Court
is clearly favoring a particular faith, which supposedly is especially
contrary to the Establishment Clause. I would like to know why
prayer in school is not permissible but prayer in the legislature is
perfectly all right; it seems ludicrously inconsistent to me. The Su-
preme Court has said that the Ten Commandments are "plainly re-
ligious"' 25 but that the nativity scene is secular as long as it is sur-
rounded by a few reindeer or candy canes.2 6 How the Ten
Commandments are religious but the nativity scene is secular is
simply not clear to me. Of course, if they take away the candy canes
and reindeer, then the nativity scene is religious and impermissi-
ble,27 although a Chanukah menorah accompanied by a Christmas
tree and a sign saluting liberty is nonreligious and permissible.2
Obviously, the Supreme Court is not of a single mind in Establish-
ment Clause cases; rather, it is severely splintered and inconsistent.
But as previously mentioned, in some decisions the Court has moved
toward allowing more ties between government and religion. Cer-
tainly, although there is this inconsistency, the trend is toward al-
lowing more government establishment of religion. In 1988, in
Bowen v. Kendrick,2 9 the Supreme Court departed from precedent
to uphold the constitutionality of federal grants to religious denomi-
19. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
20. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977).
21. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
22. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229.
23. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962).
24. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
25. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980).
26. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
27. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598-602 (1989).
28. Id. at 613-21.
29. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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national organizations to provide counseling about premarital sex
and pregnancy." I think that decision was a clear departure from
precedent that allows more government ties with religion. The Su-
preme Court is becoming more acquiescent to government-sup-
ported religion while becoming less tolerant of an individual's free
exercise of religion. In all probability, James Madison would have
viewed both of these developments as harmful and prejudicial to re-
ligion itself.
30. Id. at 617-18.
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